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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED NATIONS
OSCAR SCHACHTER

MUCH has been said in recent years about the function of law in
the United Nations. As in the case of most other aspects of the
United Nations, there have been two opposing schools, neither satisfied with what has taken place. There are, on the one hand, those who
favoring a stronger legal order, deplore what they consider to be the
minor position of law in the United Nations. In their view the United
Nations has become a wholly political organization governed in its
actions largely by expediency and the self-interest of the Member
States, with little regard for legal principles and procedures.
There is, in contrast, another group equally dissatisfied with
the United Nations, but for the opposite reason. For them the Charter
is too "legal" in that it seeks to impose upon international relations
a framework of abstract juridical principles, together with procedures
under which these principles would be applied by international organs.
In their view this "legalistic-moralistic" approach tends to be rigid
and unrealistic; it ignores the facts of power and thus gives rise to
illusions impeding the normal channels of diplomacy through which
States can best adjust their conflicts of interest.
Although the remedies which they prescribe are radically different, both schools proceed, it seems, from a somewhat similar-and, it
is submitted, unduly narrow-conception of the nature and function
of law in the United Nations. Both tend to conceive of the law principally as a body of existing and fairly precise rules, imposing restraints on conduct; and both tend to lay emphasis on the judicial
decision as the essential means for applying and giving specific effect
to these rules. Little, if any, attention is paid to other, less obvious,
aspect§ of the role of law: for example, to the way in which usage and
precedent develop into legal rules; to the function of legal concepts
and doctrine in political decisions; or to the manner in which new
institutional arrangements generate law and legal procedures; or to
the complexities of decision-making by both judicial and non-judicial
organs.' Yet these aspects, and others, merit consideration as part
OSCAR SCHACHTER is the Director of the General Legal Division of the United Nations Secretariat. The views expressed in this paper are, however, his own and do not
necessarily reflect the official views of the Organization with which he is associated.
1 For a broad framework of analysis, see McDouaAL, INTE.ATIONAL LAw, POWER
AND PoLicy, in HAGUE ACADEmMY OF INT. LAW, RECUEI, DES COURS, 137 If. (1953).
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of the complicated and variegated pattern of legal activity within the
framework of the United Nations. It may perhaps be as fruitful in
some respects to analyze what is taking place as to continue the debate, on too little versus too much, law.
The present paper is in the nature of a general survey, necessarily
brief and somewhat sketchy, of the role of law in the practice of the
United Nations. It will cover not only the role of general international
law and the legal organs, such as the International Court and the International Law Commission, but also those aspects which pertain
to the newly emerging law of the United Nations. In the main it will
be descriptive and analytic, but now and then some evaluation will
be attempted-always, of course, with due regard to the restraints
imposed upon international civil servants.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CHARTER AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
BEFOPE proceeding to a survey of the practice, it seems logical to
consider the formal position of international law in the Charter.
International lawyers have observed, generally with misgivings,
that the Charter contains relatively few references to international
law and that these are mainly in the nature of general statements of
purposes or in respect of judicial procedures. Nowhere, it has been
pointed out,2 is it expressly said that the organs and Members of
the United Nations must be governed by international law; nor is
there any provision which explicitly affirms the continued validity
of international law.
While these statements are correct, there can still be no doubt that
the Charter does recognize by clear implication, if not explicitly, that
international law remains generally valid and binding, except only to
the extent that it may be inconsistent with specific terms of the Charter itself. A brief review of the provisions which relate specifically
to international law makes it evident that they necessarily assume the
continued validity and binding effect of international law.
Thus the Preamble and Article 1 assert as a fundamental purpose
of the United Nations respect for and conformity with international
law. Article 13 provides for the encouragement of the progressive development of international law and its codification. Article 33 in2 Eagleton, Analysis of the Problem of War (New York 1937).
ACAD. oF Pour. Sci. 70, 71 (1954).
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cludes arbitration and judicial settlement among the methods to be
used for the settlement of disputes. Article 36, paragraph 3, is more
specific: it states that in making recommendations for the settlement
of disputes, the Security Council "should also take into consideration
that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties
to the International Court of Justice in accordance with provisions
of the Statute of the Court." The provisions relating to the Court are
even more significant in this connection. The very establishment of
the Court as the principal judicial organ to decide cases "in accordance with international law" and the specific provisions of Article 38
of the Statute on the sources of law necessarily implies the binding
character of general international law. To say, as some have, that the
Charter has disregarded or replaced international law is obviously at
variance with the Charter itself.
Moreover, the Charter is a product of international law. Its basic
principles, set forth in Article 2 and elsewhere, have been said to be
declaratory of general principles of international law. Whether or not
this is strictly correct, they are certainly closely similar to the fundamental precepts of international law. In addition, one finds throughout the Charter concepts, terms and phrases which have been developed in international law and which can only be fully understood
by reference to the international law context from which they have
been taken. There is also, of course, the fact that the Charter is a
treaty and, as a treaty, it is subject to the rules of international law
in-so-far as they are applicable. 3
For these various reasons, it is evident that notwithstanding the
few references to law in the Charter itself, international law has in
principle a considerable place in the formal system of the United Nations. To what extent it plays a part in actual practice will be the
main subject of this paper.
THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE ORGANS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AN OBVIOUS starting point for this survey are the resolutions
themselves. To what extent do they expressly incorporate and apply
rules of international law? Of approximately 1000 resolutions adopted
by the General Assembly, perhaps fifty refer to international law.
3 Advisory Opinion of the Int. Court of Justice on Admission of a State to the
United Nations, I. C. J. Rep. 61 (1948).
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Many of these deal with the International Law Commission, its administration and its projects; they can hardly be considered as instances in which the General Assembly used or relied upon international law. There are, however, some resolutions adopted by the General Assembly which do include principles declaratory of international
law, as for example the resolutions formulating the Nuremberg principles 4 and those dealing with the rights and duties of States.5 A few
others are more specific: they enunciate rules of international law
and assert their applicability to particular situations and disputes
before the General Assembly. Examples in this category are the
resolutions concerning prisoners of war, in connection with Korea or
World War II, which affirm the principles of international law relating to the voluntary repatriation of such prisoners of war.6
In the case of organs other than the General Assembly (excepting, of course, the International Court and the International Law
Commission) the resolutions contain very few, if any, references to
international law. The Security Council, the Economic and Social
Council, and the Trusteeship Council are not inclined to deal with
their particular problems in terms of general principles of law. When
references of a legal character are included in a resolution, they are
usually related to the terms of the Charter or, in some cases, to applicable treaties.
Even in applying those terms and phrases of the Charter which
are derived from international law and which have a specific meaning
in general international law, the organs have rarely, if ever, expressly
referred to the rules of international law. They have generally preferred to apply the Charter provisions solely with reference to the
particular facts and without expressing a ratio decidendi. The fact
that the interpretations may be at variance with those of general
international law is not considered controlling. Thus the concept of
"State" has been applied in some cases to entities which under general international law should not have been regarded as "States". The
term "domestic jurisdiction" has also been applied without attaching
decisive importance to the precedents and doctrine of international
law.' This approach is in keeping with the intentions of the drafters
of the Charter, who, it will be recalled, deleted the qualifying phrase
4 Gen. Assem. Res. 177(11) (1947).
5 Gen. Assem. Res. 178(II) (1947).
6 Gen. Assem. Res. 804(VIII) (1953).
7 See, 1 REPERTORY OF UNsm NATIONS PRACTCE 55-159 (1955).
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"as determined by international law" after the words "domestic jurisdiction".8
The fact that international law does not entirely determine the
interpretation of these legal concepts does not mean that their prior
history and import are disregarded. It is obvious, on reflection, that
such terms still receive their primary connotations from the body of
law out of which they have come. Such new interpretations as may
be made by the United Nations are only variations, extensions or contractions of the field of application, on the basic meaning of the term.
In many controversial issues the debates include references to international law precedents although rarely is it maintained that the meaning of the term is completely determined by such precedents. Thus
with respect to these concepts, there is, one might say, a substratum
of international law on the basis of which the special law of the
United Nations is developing." This aspect will be dealt with below
in the final portions of this paper; at this point I have only wished to
indicate that while general international law is not usually referred to
in resolutions, it necessarily plays a part, though only implicitly, in
determining the effect of the legal concepts of the Charter.
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
IT is generally accepted that the touchstone of a truly legal order
is the judicial function and that the essential measure of respect for
law is the extent to which legal disputes are submitted to impartial
adjudication. From this point of view those who favor the rule of
law in international affairs are especially concerned that more use has
not been made of the International Court by the Member States and
by the organs of the United Nations.
The pertinent statistics can be briefly stated. In ten years, the
Court has delivered judgments in ten cases between states. 10 Ad8 The purpose of the deletion, as Mr. Dulles pointed out at the time, was to free
the organization from the precedents of International Law so that the principle of domestic jurisdiction would be "simple in conception and flexible in application" and the
United Nations thereby better able to meet changing circumstances. See N. Y. Times,
June 16, 1945, p. 9, col. 3.
9 See, also, SCHACETER, DEVELOPMFNT or INTERNATIONAL LAW, 25 Brrxsn YEARBOOK Or INT. L. 91-145 (1948).
10 A number of applications by States have been submitted but were in themselves
not sufficient for jurisdiction in the absence of agreement by the respondent State, e.g,
the United States brought cases against U.S.S.R., Hungary and Czechoslovakia in regard to aerial incidents, but since the respondent States were not bound by acceptance
of the optional clause and did not agree to submit in the particular case, the Court
lacked jurisdiction under Article 36 of its Statute.
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visory opinions have been requested on nine occasions by the General
Assembly. The Security Council has only once (in the Corfu Channel
case) referred a dispute to the Court in pursuance of Article 36(3) of
the Charter." It must be conceded that this is not an impressive
record.
It is true that the General Assembly has adopted by overwhelming majority various resolutions calling for greater utilization of the
Court. 2 These resolutions have recommended that States more frequently take disputes to the Court, that more States adhere to the
optional clause, that compromissary clauses be inserted in treaties, and
that advisory opinions be requested on legal questions by the organs
and the specialized agencies. But as the above figures show, it cannot be said that these recommendations have been substantially followed, particularly in respect of the actual submission of cases to
the Court. In regard to the optional clause, there have been thirtysix adherences, generally with reservations. These reservations are
not always of an extensive nature, but some States, including the
United States, have made reservations which go a long way toward
reducing the compulsory effect of the acceptance.
Although the Court has not been utilized as fully as many would
have desired, it would be short-sighted to conclude that its role has
been without significance. In its relatively few judgments and advisory opinions it has made a considerable contribution to the body of
international law. The judgments of the Court in the disputes between
States have dealt with and have clarified a great number of problems in substantive fields of international law, as well as in regard to
treaty questions and questions of international adjudication.' Within
the United Nations, the advisory opinions on constitutional questions
have had considerable influence, not only on the specific problems
dealt with, but more significantly, with respect to the basic approach
to interpretations of the Charter. Especially noteworthy are three
advisory opinions: "Reparations for Injuries", 4 "South West Africa ' 5
and "Awards of Compensation", 6 which affirm in broad terms the
11

U. N. Charter Art. 36(3).
Gen. Assem. Res. 171(11), Pts. A, B, and C (1947).
13 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office of the United
Kingdom, has provided a most valuable analysis of the Court's contribution to 'legal
doctrine in three articles in BmsEr YEABoox OF INT. L. for the years 1950, 1951
and 1952.
'4 I C. 3. Rep. 174 (1949).
15 I. C. '.Rep. 140 (1950).
16 1. C. 3. Rep. 47 (1954).
12
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capacity of the Organization to adopt means to give effect to its basic
purposes and functions. The principles set forth in these opinions
have given judicial sanction to what is generally called "liberal construction", but which might more accurately be described as interpretation which takes full account of the context of particular terms of
an instrument, including its major purposes. The fact that the Court
has given its approval to this approach has already had, and no doubt
will continue to have, considerable influence on the doctrine and practice of the United Nations.
It may be instructive to those who complain of international law
as too rigid and too abstract to examine these judgments and advisory opinions of the International Court. One will find that general
principles of law have been applied with considerable regard to specific
circumstances and practical requirements. For example, even in so
technical a legal question as the territorial issue before the Court in
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, the judgment was based not on
abstract principles alone, but on geographical factors and on the "economic interest peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of
which are clearly evidenced by a long usage".17 Similar examples
might be cited from other judgments and opinions to demonstrate that
these judicial decisions in the international field are by no means the
product of purely abstract speculation.
Have the Court opinions and judgments been respected? The
record here is not quite as good as that of the Permanent Court in
the League period. There is the outstanding example of Albania,
which has refused to pay the judgment in the Corfu Channel case.
However, all other judgments have been respected and even in the
Corfu Channel case the judgment for damages may be given effect
indirectly." The advisory opinions have not always received universal support, but they have generally been accepted as authoritative statements of the law, even though in two cases States directly
affected have refused to follow the opinion.
On the whole, the Court has maintained for itself the respect
due the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. The judges
have been jurists of standing and ability; their prestige has not been
lessened by the fact that several have on occasion taken positions
17 I. C. J. Rep. 133 (1951).

Is Statement of United States, France and United Kingdom in connection with
Washington Agreement of April 25, 1951, concerning Italian monetary gold, published
in 24 DFs'T STATE BULL. 785 (1951).
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different from those of their governments. Within the profession their
decisions have been well received.
The crucial fact remains, however, that the Court has not been
utilized to the extent it might have been. Exhortations by jurists and
resolutions by the General Assembly have had little effect on the submission of cases by governments or, for that matter, on requests for
advisory opinions by the United Nations or its specialized agencies.
One might perhaps attribute this simply to the tensions in international
relations or, as sometimes stated, to the fact that the international
community has not yet developed the "integration" which is a prior
condition for the acceptance of judicial settlement. These highly generalized conclusions are no doubt true (indeed, they are close to being
tautologies) but they contribute little to the goal of extending the
Court's role under present conditions. It may be fruitful for scholars
to examine the problem in more specific terms, perhaps to study in
particular cases the conditions under which States have submitted
disputes to adjudications, and the factors which have led to such submissions and the considerations in other cases which have impeded
reference to international judicial or arbitral tribunals. The records of
the United Nations may also be profitably examined in this connection for they throw considerable light on the reasons for the hesitation of governments to submit their particular disputes to international
adjudication. 19
It should not be assumed (as international lawyers often tend to
do) that the reluctance of governments to agree to obligatory judicial
settlement is simply a "nationalistic" rejection of international law
and order. The analogy to the judicial process within a national state,
which is frequently drawn, is highly misleading. One significant difference can be attributed to the uncertain and fragmentary character
of much of international law today. This has been expressed in striking terms by the great British scholar, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, a
member of the International Court of Justice:
"Once we approach at close quarters practically any branch of
international law we are driven, amidst some feeling of incredulity,
to the conclusion that although there is, as a rule, a consensus of
opinion on broad principle-even this may be an over-estimate in some
cases-there is no semblance of agreement in relation to specific rules
and problems."2 0
19 See V
20

REPmTORY OF UNiTE
NATIONS PRACTICE, Art. 96, Paras. 50-109 (1955).
Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International Law, 49 Am. J. INr.

L. 17 (1955).
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The fact- that there is such uncertainty as to specific rules of law
does not simply mean that there is "non-justiciability" in a technical
sense; as many have demonstrated, this obstacle can be overcome
from the judicial standpoint through the creative use by the Court of
-the rich resources of legal techniques and general principles. But the
the heart of the matter is that the "creative" judicial role (which is
inevitable in the circumstances) involves an exceedingly broad grant
of latitude and discretion to the 15 individuals sitting on the International Court. The exercise of such discretion, moreover, cannot easily
be checked by governments through legislation, as would be the case
in national law.
In these circumstances, it cannot reasonably be expected that governments will lightly submit important questions to a process of judicial settlement, which may amount substantially to judicial legislation. The fact that such "legislation" takes place under the respectable guise of the application of general principles of law"' 1 does not
obscure for governments the fact that, it constitutes, in effect, a delegation of decision-making authority to a small group of individuals
who, respected though they be, are not responsible either to their
several governments or to collective governmental bodies.
There are, moreover, other significant obstacles to international
adjudication which cannot be overlooked. Experience has shown that
the judicial process is not likely to be resorted to or accepted by governments asserting claims or taking action involving a change in the
legal status quo. Even though these governments normally claim support in law, they are aware that their case rests not on conformity
with existing rules (if any 'apply) but on political or moral grounds
which will probably not be accepted as authoritative by a judicial tribunal. 2 In such situations, governments will understandably prefer
diplomatic or political processes, or perhaps simply reliance on toleration, or non-action by other states, rather than judicial procedures.
Why then, it may be asked, do states ever resort to judicial procedures in international disputes? One reason, simply, is that in many
situations the interests at stake are relatively minor and the states are
consequently prepared to abide by judicial settlement rather than reId. at 20.
Professor Julius Stone has observed that in the present situation "violations of
existing rules may sometimes be regarded as fulfilling part of the legislative function,
which in more integrated orders is fulfilled by institutionalized conscious creative legis21
22

latfon." PRoc. AM. Soc. INT. L., 203-(April-27, 1956).
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sort to political pressures. The disputes between states before both
the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International
Court of Justice have been largely in this category.2"
However, there may be occasions when the disputes cannot be
regarded as unimportant and where indeed they have become involved
with political aspects which make negotiation or compromise difficult.
In these cases the opportunity for authoritative judicial settlement
may serve a political need and consequently lead to submission of the
dispute. One may see in certain requests for advisory opinions similar elements.2 4
Advisory opinions, as may be expected, are more "political" than
contentious.25 One reason for this is that a majority in the General
Assembly may resort to the Court without the consent of the states
directly concerned, in the belief that a judicial opinion will exert an
influence, by virtue of its authoritative legal character, on the conduct of the state concerned, or perhaps serve to identify that state as
defaulting on its international obligations.
Lastly, we should not overlook the fact that governments will in
some cases, at least, favor judicial settlement simply because of a
rational appreciation of the merits of an orderly procedure based on
legal standards and international obligations. This belief, based in
large part on national attitudes and habits of long duration, will probably be strengthened as more cases are brought and more troublesome
disputes settled through judicial processes. But one cannot safely predict that progress in this direction will be rapid. In the United States,
it took some 50 years before the separate States accepted the decisions
of the Supreme Court on boundary questions, and it was over 80 years
before any other question of importance between the States was submitted to the Supreme Court.26
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
MoiR directly than the Court, it is the International Law Commission which serves as the chosen instrument of the United Nations
See, LissiTzYN, TFE INTERNATioNAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 76-77 (New York .1951).
For example, the request by the General Assembly in 1953 for an advisory
opinion on "Awards of Compensation by the Administrative Tribunal' (Res. 785(VIII)
1953), involving an issue on which the United States had taken a strong position but
did not receive majority support.
25 See, V REPERTORY OF UNITED NAnoNs PRACTICE, Art. 96 (1955).
26 Warren, The Supreme Court and Disputes Between States, 366 INT. CONC ATION 40 (Jan. 1941).
23
24
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for the development and systematization of international law. The
long history of previous attempts through unofficial and official channels did not discourage the international legal profession in its hope
that a significant contribution could be made by the United Nations
through a body of highly-qualified experts. As in other fields, the op.
timism of the early years has been largely replaced by a reserved, even
cynical, attitude toward the Commission and its work. It is submitted that in this shift from the one to the other extreme there has been
a loss of balance and perspective. With this in mind, I should like
to review briefly the objectives, as well as the work and achievements,
of the Commission.
The Commission's work is divided by its Statute into two broad
areas: "progressive development" and "codification". The field of "development" covers in principle those urgent and novel questions
which warrant international regulation and which have not been covered by extensive State practice, precedent, and doctrine. Codification, in contrast, embraces in principle the whole field of existing international law where there already has been extensive practice, precedent and doctrine. In both fields the objectives would be attained
through the means of multilateral conventions. However, the Commission has not been required in the first instance to produce drafts
which are intended to be adopted immediately as conventions. It may
submit drafts which, for various reasons, are not considered likely to
secure the acceptance of the majority of States. Such drafts may state
the existing law on which there is agreement; they may clarify questions in which there is disagreement; they may suggest solutions of
conflicting views, and they may propose changes if they consider the
existing law obsolete or otherwise inadequate. Such drafts would have
a preliminary status in the form of suggestions or recommendations.
However, it was contemplated that they would in all likelihood exercise influence either as statements of the existing law, or as indications
of what future developments would be desirable. In short, the scope
of the Commission is comprehensive both in regard to the methods
which it may follow and the fields which it may cover.
The Commission only began its work in 1949; it has recently
completed its eighth session. It has been assigned by the General Assembly several subjects which fall essentially in the realm of "progressive development" as contemplated by the Statute. Foremost
among these projects has been the preparation of a draft Code of
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Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. This draft code
has been limited by the Commission to offences containing a political
element and endangering or disturbing the maintenance of peace and
security, omitting questions concerning conflicts of .legislation and
jurisdiction in international criminal matters.2 7 A related project has
been a formulation of the Nuremberg principles.2 8 In the same general field, the Commission submitted a report on the question of the
definition of aggression and included a general definition of aggression in the draft Code of Offences.2"
The International Law Commission has also studied, at the request of the General Assembly, the establishment of an international
organ of criminal justice, and concluded that this was both desirable and possible. Subsequently the General Assembly established a
special committee in 1951 to prepare a draft Statute, again in 1953,
a second special committee to revise this draft Statute. a°
The problem of "statelessness" was referred to the Commission,
as one in the field of progressive development. In 1954 the Commission recommended two draft conventions on the elimination and reduction of statelessness which will probably be considered by a conference of Governments in the near future.3 '
In the field of codification, the Commission selected fourteen
subjects of international law for priority treatment. The first project
it completed in this area is a Code of Arbitral Procedure which has
been considered by Governments and discussed at some length in the
General Assembly. Further discussion of the draft is expected to take
place in the General Assembly in 1958 and, perhaps, at that time a
conference will be considered to conclude a convention on this subject. In the meanwhile, it is believed that the draft may inspire states
in drawing up provisions for inclusion in international treaties and
special arbitration agreements.32
The most ambitious undertaking of the Commission has been its
project on the Law of the High Seas and Territorial Waters. The
27 REPORT Or Tms INT. LAW Coem. 6th Sess. (1954), Gen. Assem. Doc. A/2693.
Also, 48 Am. J. INT. L. 17-23 (1955), Supplement of Documents.
28 REPORT Or TEE INT. LAW Com.

2d Sess.

(1950),

Gen. Assem. Doc. A/1316.

Also, 44 Am. J. INT. L. 125-134 (1950), Supplement of Documents.
29 REPORT OF TE INT. LAW Co m. 3d Sess. (1951), Gen. Assem. Doc. A/1858.
Also, 45 Am. J. INT. L. 118-123 (1951), Supplement of Documents.
30 Gen. Assem. Doc. A/2645 (1954).
31 REPORT O THF INT. LAW Comm. 6th Sess. 2-8 (1954).

Gen. Assem, Doc. A/2693.

Also, 3 249 A.m. J. INT. L. 3-16 (1955), Supplement of Documents.
-Gen. Assem. Res. 989(X) (1955).
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work in this field was begun in 1949 and completed in 1956 at the
8th session of the Commission. In the course of seven years, a great
many drafts on a variety of subjects were considered by the Commission. In addition, technical assistance was received through conferences held on fisheries and on hydrographic problems. The comprehensive report of the Commission contains 72 draft articles with
3
commentaries under each of the articles. 3
It has become evident to the Commission, in connection with its
work on arbitral procedure and the law of the sea, that the distinction in the Statute between "development" and "codification" cannot
be easily maintained. Not only were there wide differences of opinion
as to whether a subject is "sufficiently developed in practice", but also
a number of provisions based on general principles of law had to be
considered as proposals for new law when formulated in specific
terms. Thus, the drafts on Arbitral Procedure and on the Law of the
Sea contain a mixture of lex lata and de lege ferenda. The Commission has been compelled to give up the attempt to specify which articles fall into one and which into the other category, since several do
not wholly belong to either category. Moreover, the effort to codify
international law has revealed that there is far less agreement on what
constitutes specific rules of international law than it previously had
been thought to be the case.34 The implication which Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has drawn (and with which few would disagree) is that the
work of codification of international law must be regarded as substantially legislative in nature. "It must consist essentially in inducing governments (or some governments) to accept new law".3
The problem of inducing governments to accept new law cannot
be resolved solely in terms of technical legal issues. There are, it is
true, a few questions on which the divergence of opinions among governments may be due to doctrinal formulation and other technical
differences. In the great majority of situations, however, the lack of
agreement on specific rules is clearly due to the conflicting claims and
interests of governments in various spheres of international relations.
This is so even in regard to questions which have been considered as
highly-technical, such as the Law of Treaties or certain aspects of
the Law of the Sea. On closer examination and in the light of posi8th Sess. (1956), Gen. Assem. Doc. A/3159.
34 S11pra, p. 35.
35 Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International Law, 49 Am. J;
INT. L. 29 (1955).
33 REPORT OF THE INT. LAW CoMM.

1957]

ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

tions taken by governments, it has become apparent that these technical questions frequently involve substantial political and practical
differences among the states concerned.
This is not to say that the scientific and technical work of the
Commission must be regarded as useless. Such scientific and technical effort serves, in the first place, to bring out the extent of the divergencies in opinion, with all their implications and, secondly, to
reveal the various factors political, economic, strategic and so forth,
which must be considered in connection with the formulation of a legal
rule. Thus, in connection with the problems of the Law of the Sea,
the International Law Commission necessarily had to concern itself
with the economic and biological problems involved in the conservation
of fisheries. 36 The Commission may also, without abandoning its scientific character, lay the proper emphasis on those fundamental policies of international society which have been formulated and accepted
as general principles of international law. It may therefore, and indeed it has a duty to, give full weight in its technical work to the
principles of the Charter and such other formulations of general
principles of law as have been widely accepted.
In the end, however, the essential task of developing and codifying. international law through the machinery of the United Nations
remains a responsibility of government, and not a scientific undertaking. Governments do not easily give up substantial claims and interests simply to advance the development of law; they frequently are
reluctant to agree on rules in abstracto without seeking to preserve the
maximum freedom of action. Yet, recognizing these profound obstacles, one must also bear in mind that governments, as well as legal
scholars, are aware of the need for legal standards and for reconciling their divergencies in order to arrive at such standards. It need not
always be considered desirable that such rules develop entirely through
practice in particular cases; in many matters, the felt necessities may
call for the conscious formulation of general rules based on the "rationally conceived interests of States"3 represented around the conference table. The process of adjustment and compromise will no
doubt be laborious and time-consuming; it will be restricted by unfavourable political circumstances and impeded by the clash of ideo36 The Commission took account of the report of the Technical Conference on the
Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, held at Rome in 1955. See, REPORT
OF S H

SESSION OF INTERATIONAL LAW COMMISSION.

37 Note 35, supra.
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logical and economic interests. But in a world which has become increasingly interdependent, the actual needs and interests of the governments dictate that the task be pursued and offer hope that a measure of success will be attained.
THE USE OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS
THE International Law Commission is not, of course, the only
means for the development of international law through international
conventions. The Charter expressly authorizes the Economic and
Social Council to prepare draft conventions on subjects within its
competence for submission to the General Assembly; it also authorizes
the Council to convene international conferences, and in keeping with
long usage, such conferences have generally been used to prepare conventions for direct submission to the governments.
There is nothing novel in the use of multilateral conventions for
the adoption of regulations in economic and social matters. It is the
traditional, and one might say, the most conservative method for extending the rule of law into areas previously left to the discretion of
States. The late Senator Taft, it will be recalled, formulated his own
foreign policy objective largely in terms of "law-making" treaties:

".... in the long run the only way to establish peace is to write a law,
agreed to by each of the nations, to govern the relations of such nations with each other and to obtain the covenant of all such nations
that they will abide by that law and by decisions made thereunder."3 8
Although a great deal has been said of the excessive adoption of
treaties by the United Nations, the record will show that multilateral
conventions have been used by the United Nations much less than
they were in the League period. Indeed, during the League period the
international convention was considered the principal, and probably
the ideal method for dealing with international economic, social and
legal problems. Today in the United Nations the multilateral convention is practically never used for major economic and social problems,
retaining its importance only in subsidiary matters, such as transportation and narcotics, where it has long been used.
Before discussing the reasons for this change, it would be useful
to review briefly the number and types of conventions actually concluded by or under the auspices of the United Nations. The total figure, somewhat over 100 such agreements (excluding the specialized
38 R. A. TAmt, A FOREIGN POLICY FOR ALERicANs 37 (Garden City 1951).
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agencies' conventions), is misleading, since a large part of this number
consists of protocols and other instruments which merely provide for
the transfer of functions under conventions which previously assigned
responsibilities to the League of Nations and its agencies. Another
part includes the various agreements of a constitutional or administrative character involving international organizations as, for example,
the instruments establishing specialized agencies and the various
agreements on privileges and immunities. A third category would include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 9 and some forty
related protocols which in themselves constitute a considerable part
of the total number of agreements; they are, in effect, a network of
legal rules in the field of international trade. In the field of human
rights there is, of course, the Genocide Convention (which in40
cidentally has received more ratifications than any other treaty)
and the Convention on the Status of Refugees. One should mention also the Convention on Road Traffic and other more limited
technical conventions affecting international transportation. Finally
there are two recent conventions of limited application in the field of
narcotics and several new conventions liberalizing customs procedures.
Several of the specialized agencies have also contributed multilateral agreements which establish new rules in economic and social
matters. The International Labour Organisation has by now adopted
over a hundred conventions, of which approximately seventy-five
have entered into force. The total number of ratifications of all
I.L.O. conventions is probably as high as fifteen hundred.41
Other specialized agencies which have utilized international conventions for the development of legal standards are the International
Civil Aviation Organization and the World Health Organization. The
World Health Organization has adopted international sanitary regulations which cover a wide area in the field of sanitary and quarantine requirements and standards with respect to medical products moving into international commerce. In the case of the International Civil
Aviation Organization, international standards have been adopted in
the form of annexes to the convention which become effective within
three months after submission to the contracting States, unless in the
meantime a majority of such States express approval.
39 55 U. N. Treaty Series 187 (1950).
40 See, U. N. Pub., "Status of Multilateral Conventions," ST/LEG/3.
41 See, INT. LABOR CoNPERENcE, "Conventions and Recornmendations-1919-1949.'
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It is apparent that in some fields, multilateral agreements have
continued to play a considerable, if not an indispensable role in international regulation. There can be little question of the utility and desirability of such agreements in respect of international aviation, sanitary requirements, inland transport and narcotic control. The international labour conventions, while more controversial, have come to
be adopted on a wide scale; and the tariff and trade agreements, still
relatively novel and debatable, have already been proven to have advantages not available in bilateral agreements.
Apart from these fields, however, the prospect for the so-called
law-making treaties does not appear promising. In part this may be
attributed to the concern shown by the United States over the Covenant of Human Rights and other suggested treaties concerning human rights and likely to effect domestic legislation. There are other
reasons, too, of a more general character which have given rise to
scepticism as to the efficacy and advisability of new international
conventions.
These reasons seem worth noting for they indicate some of the
limitations and disadvantages in using conventions as a means of international regulation. In the first place, many conventions which
have been negotiated over a period of years never come into force, or
they only come into force after a considerable delay and between a
very limited group of States, so that their value is greatly restricted.
In some cases, the conventions come into force only because parties
have made reservations of so far-reaching a character that the instrument has lost a good deal of its value. Parenthetically, it might be
noted that the resolution of the General Assembly concerning reservations has tended to favor the making of reservations and thus to
42
weaken the effect of the instrument negotiated.
Moreover, provision is not usually made for international supervision of performance, with the result that the application of the Convention is left to the parties; consequently there are large gaps between the agreement and its actual performance. Even when instruments include provisions for judicial settlement, few cases are brought
though there may be many controversies as to the interpretation of
the agreement. There is, further, the difficulty which some of the.fed42 Gen. Assem. Res. 598(VI) (1952). For a valuable analysis of this problem, see
Cox, Address, Reservations to Multipartite Conventions, PROCEEDiNGS, Am. Soc. INT. L.
26-35 (1952).
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eral States, such as the United States and Canada, have in participating in treaties which deal with problems left to the provinces
or constituent states. This particular problem has assumed major proportions in respect of proposals for new conventions in economic and
social matters.
Finally, it should be noted that the use of international conventions puts heavy emphasis on purely contractual aspects and not infrequently produces an unnecessary rigidity in fields which are subject to rapid change. Some techniques have been evolved to counter43
act this, as for example, in the 1949 Convention on Road Traffic
but they are not usual and have only infrequently been applied. The
very fact that conventions are binding only on their parties may in
certain cases involve serious disadvantages for the parties vis-h-vis
other States which remain free to maintain lower standards. Is is
usually difficult to include in a convention provisions to protect the
parties against consequences of this kind. Consequently, in many
fields it would seem preferable to have standards set by collective
decisions of organs which can easily be amended and which take into
account the very different stages of economic and social development
in the various States.
It is apparent from this brief analysis of the limitations of multilateral conventions that such instruments are not always an effective
or desirable method of imposing international standards or regulations. The fact that many States have become increasingly sceptical
of their value cannot be simply attributed to nationalism or domestic
politics; as we have seen there may be good reasons in many cases for
an attitude of caution toward proposals for new international agreements of a law-making character. There is, however, the danger-to
some extent already manifested-that caution in the matter of treaties
may become indiscriminate opposition to almost all proposed conventions. Quite obviously this would not serve the interests of the States
concerned, for there can be no doubt that in many fields the multilateral agreement is an indispensable method of accomplishing international regulation.
The difficult problem is to decide in each case whether a given
objective can be more suitably and effectively achieved through a
treaty than through other possible methods. In the early years of the
43 The annexes containing the detailed provisions can easily be amended or replaced. Text of convention may be found in U. N. Pub. Sales No. 1990, VIII. 2.
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United Nations this preliminary question was not usually gone into;
the tendency was simply to assume that a convention would be desirable if the objective was agreed to. In recent years, more consideration is being given to alternative methods and to the disadvantages
of the treaty method. More attention is also being given to special
provisions which might alleviate some of the difficulties, for example,
federal-state clauses, or more flexible provisions on amendments and
reservations. These are probably steps in the right direction though
they do not as yet go very far. They would undoubtedly be more
fruitful if there were available more empirical studies on the actual
application and functioning of multilateral conventions and on the
conditions which influence their acceptance or rejection in various
States. Independent research on these and related subjects might be
of considerable value in shaping future developments in this presently
controversial area.
THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS
UP TO this point, this survey has dealt principally with the traditional aspects of general international law, its principles and concepts, the International Court, the work of development and codification and the use of multilateral treaties. This final section embodies
a rather different aspect, the law of the United Nations itself.
It has been evident for some years that out of the many activities of the United Nations, political, technical, administrative, a body
of law is being generated, and that slowly, in some cases imperceptibly, practice, usage, procedures and agreements are developing into
"norms" accepted as legally binding by the States and organs of the
United Nations.
This development is probably most obvious in regard to the legal
relationships and situations created by the activities of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies vis-A-vis States and persons outside of these organizations. In this area one finds, by now,, wellestablished doctrine and precedents, regarding the legal status and
capacity of the Organization. There is the well-known opinion of the
International Court in the "Reparation for Injuries" case, affirming
the international personality of the United Nations, not only for its
Members but for the international community as a whole.44 There
are, in addition, the various agreements (including the Convention on
44 I. C. J. Rep. 174 (1949).
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the Privileges and Immunities)4 5 which establish the legal position
of the Organization on the national level and which form the basis
for judicial proceedings undertaken in national courts on a variety
of questions. In its day to day activities, the United Nations deals
with and disposes of numerous legal problems involving its relationships with companies and persons outside of the Organization. In
many instances those problems, especially in the early years, have
been handled on the basis of expediency and improvisation without
attempts at systematic development of principles. Even.in such cases
46
the basic agreements (for example, the Headquarters Agreement)
and the general policy regarding the proper role and function of the
United Nations have played a part in shaping the day to day decisions. Inevitably, precedents have been followed and practice has
gradually come to be accepted as legally binding.
A similar, though far more controversial, development has taken
place in respect of the internal functioning of the Organization. In
this field, basic principles have been laid down by the Charter, but
large areas are subject to conflicting interpretation, or are simply left
to the discretion of the organs concerned. It is true that within these
areas, the individual Member States are theoretically free to make
their own interpretations, since the Charter has not provided for a
method of binding interpretation. However, this theoretical freedom
is in practice substantially limited by the process of making collective
decisions. For in reaching such decisions, particularly in respect of
interpretations of the Charter, the weight of practice and precedent
often makes itself effectively felt. The reason for this is in part a
practical one: States are often aware that they may at some time or
another be in a minority and consequently many act on the assumption that their own interest would be served in such contingency, if
the organs maintained consistent lines of practice and respect for principle. This factor undoubtedly plays a part in influencing collective
decisions, for in the process of gathering support for a proposal,
compromises and adjustments have to be made to win the support
of those States (even if relatively few) which place great emphasis on
the legal element. One can even cite several occasions when the majority in the United Nations rejected proposals, which they considered
legally invalid, although favored politically. 7
45

Convention is annex to Gen. Assem. Res. 22 A(I) (1946).

46 Agreement is annex to Gen. Assem. Res. 169(11) (1947).
47 E.g., Trusteeship Council considered itself unable to permit Italy, then not a
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Another factor which is worth mentioning in this connection is
the tendency to give considerable weight in interpreting the Charter to
the "subsequent practice" of the parties. The International Court has
given authoritative approval to this tendency; it has on several occasions affirmed that in interpreting the Charter or other treaties, recourse to the practice of the States and the organs is not only permitted, but constitutes important evidence of what the correct interpretation is.45 The fact that practice is increasingly taken into account
in the interpretation of the Charter is itself an important element in
developing consistent principles, for if practice is to be relied on, it
cannot be inconsistent and obscure.
In short, it.seems to me that after ten years of application of the
Charter there has developed a far greater degree of concern for established usage and principle than may be apparent in the midst of particular controversies. In this sense it can reasonably be said that
"international law" as evidenced by the practice within the United
Nations which is accepted as law, does play a role in many decisions
taken in application of the Charter.
There is finally one other aspect of the law of the United Nations
which merits some attention. This relates to what is often referred to
as the "operational activities" of the United Nations-that is, to the
administration of funds, the rendering of services and the performance of regulatory functions. The increasing emphasis upon these
functions is probably the outstanding feature of the work of international organizations in the last few years. 49 They include the worldwide technical assistance program, extensive relief and rehabilitation
activities and regulatory activities in fields such as telecommunications
and transportation. Certain of the functions of the regional economic
commissions should also be included in this category.
These varied activities are far removed from the usual conceptions of international law. Little consideration is given to traditional
concepts and procedures in their functioning. Nevertheless in each
Member of the U. N., to vote in the Council, although majority would have favored
this. (329th Meeting of Trusteeship Council.)
48 Advisory Opinion on International Status of Southwest Africa, I. C. J. Rep.
128 (1950); Advisory Opinion on Competence of General Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations, I. C. J. Rep. 4, 9 (1950).
49 Professor W. Friedmann has aptly suggested the term "cooperative international

law" to describe such legal relationships, concerned not with interstate relations, but
with "regulation of experiments in positive international collaboration." See, Friedmann,
Some Impacts of Social Organization on International Law, 50 Am. J. INT. L. 475, at
507 (1956).
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case they are based on a resolution or agreement which is regarded as
a constitutional instrument; in addition there are numerous resolutions, rules and decisions which are taken in the course of these activities and which are accepted as legally binding by those subject to
the authority of the organ or having relations with it. As a result,
there is a wide network of international legal rules and procedures
which is being applied daily in almost every country of the world and
in a variety of matters, many of which directly affect the lives of the
persons in those countries. This phenomenon has been largely neglected by international lawyers, though its significance in the development of international law may be much greater than the more obvious
features usually dealt with.
It seems appropriate to end on this note not because it appears
to be critical of international lawyers, but because it leaves room for
a reasonably optimistic appraisal of the extent to which new international law is emerging out of the manifold activities of international
organization.

